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The Allais common consequence and common ratio paradoxes are known in decision theory as
the primary departures from expected utility. Their appeal is that even without experimenta-
tion they ring true, and with experimentation they are found to be robust. The two paradoxes
were proposed by Allais (1953) using the following hypothetical situations:1
1. Common Consequence:
Situation A: Certainty of receiving 100 million.
Situation B: 10% chance of 500 million; 89% chance of 100 million; 1% chance of
nothing.
Situation A0: 11% chance of 100 million; 89% chance of nothing.
Situation B0: 10% chance of 500 million; 90% chance of nothing.
2. Common Ratio:
Situation C: Certainty of receiving 100 milion.
Situation D: 98% chance of 500 million; 2% chance of nothing.
Situation C0: 1% chance of 100 million; 99% chance of nothing.
Situation D0: 0.98% chance of 500 million; 99.02% chance of nothing.
Situations A and B share a common consequence of winning 100 million with probability
0.89. In situations A0 and B0 this common consequence is removed. Under expected utility,
if A is preferred to B, then A0 should be preferred to B0, as the manipulation is only one of
subtracting a common consequence. Situations C and D have a ratio of probabilities of 0.98.
Situations C0 and D0 have a common ratio. Under expected utility if C is preferred to D, then
C0 should be preferred to D0, as the manipulation is only one of dividing by 100.
Despite the predictions of expected utility, the majority of subjects choose A over B, B0 over
A0 , C over D and D0 over C0 in similar problems (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).2 Allais' initial
1French francs were originally used as the currency of the paradoxes. No adjustment made for ination.
2Perhaps the most revealing subject was Leonard Savage who chose A over B and B' over A' and concluded
that his preferences were `subtly' in error (Savage, 1954, p. 103). This may have left Paul Samuelson in an
uncomfortable situation as he had stated just before, `I sometimes feel that Savage and I are the only ones in
the world who will give a consistent Bernoulli answer to questionnaires of the type that Professor Allais has
been circulating' (Samuelson, 1952, p. 678).
1motivation for the paradoxes was an intuition that expected utility's independence axiom was
`incompatible with the preference for security in the neighbourhood of certainty' (Allais, 2008,
p. 4). Decision theorists have responded to this critique by relaxing the independence axiom
and its implication of linearity in probabilities. The most important associated development
is cumulative prospect theory with its S-shaped probability weighting scheme (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995). Why then, would Allais claim to the present that
the paradoxes' true thrust is `generally misunderstood' (Allais, 2008, p. 5).
One potential source of misunderstanding is that a preference for security in the `neigh-
borhood of certainty' represents only one half of Allais' intuition. Allais also claimed that `far
from certainty', individuals act as expected utility maximizers, valuing a gamble by the math-
ematical expectation of its utility outcomes (Allais, 1953).3 Though the argument is vague as
to the denitions of `neighborhood of certainty' and `far from certainty', such statements are
revealing. In this light, the common ratio and common consequence eects read less like a
general violation of linearity in probabilities and more like a local violation that appears as any
particular outcome becomes close to perfectly certain. Indeed, if the violation is isolated very
close to certainty, it may prove useful to represent it as a violation of continuity. Individuals
may exhibit discontinuous preferences over certain and uncertain outcomes. This is similar
in spirit to the quasi-hyperbolic representation of discounting where preferences are discon-
tinuous over immediate and future outcomes (Strotz, 1956; Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson,
1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Just as a discontinuity at the present provides a simple,
tractable method for representing diminishing impatience through time, a discontinuity at cer-
tainty provides a simple, tractable way to represent a disproportionate preference for security
near to certainty. To motivate our discussion, we consider the following example:
Decision 1:
Situation P: Certainty of receiving 10 million.
Situation Q: 99% chance of 50 million; 1% chance of nothing.
3Allais' wording of `far from certainty' is `loin de certitude' (Allais, 1953, p.530, authors' translation).
2Decision 2:
Situation P 0: 99% chance of 10 million; 1% chance of nothing.
Situation Q0: 98% chance of 50 million; 2% chance of nothing.
Decision 3:
Situation P 00: 98% chance of 10 million; 2% chance of nothing.
Situation Q00: 97% chance of 50 million; 3% chance of nothing.
All three situations share a common ratio of probabilities (with only slight rounding) of
0.99. Under expected utility, if P is preferred to Q, then P 0 should be preferred to Q0, and P 00
should be preferred to Q00.4 Introspection suggests that a substantial proportion of individuals
will violate expected utility by preferring P to Q and Q0 to P 0. However, one would not expect
individuals who preferred P 0 to Q0 to prefer Q00 to P 00. That is, individuals may violate expected
utility between decisions 1 and 2, but not between 2 and 3.5
In a survey of 134 University of California, San Diego undergraduate subjects, 52 made
decision 1, 40 made decision 2, and 42 made decision 3.6 While 42.3 percent of subjects
preferred P to Q, only 22.5 percent preferred P 0 to Q0, indicating a signicant violation of
expected utility (z = 1:999; p = 0:046)7. However, the 22.5 percent preferring P 0 to Q0 is not
signicantly dierent from the 31.0 percent who preferred P 00 to Q00, indicating that expected
utility violations are less prevalent away from certainty (z =  0:864; p = 0:388).8 Conlisk
4Rounding error reinforces this prediction as 0:99 > 0:98=0:99 > 0:97=0:98. If U(10) > 0:99  U(50), then
U(10) > 0:99  U(50) > 0:98=0:99  U(50) > 0:97=0:98  U(50) by monotonicity. That is, if an individual prefers
10 million with certainty in decision 1, then the 10 million should grow more attractive in decision 2 and even
more in decision 3.
5Importantly, this occurs in a region where probability weighting is believed to be sharply decreasing (Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Prelec, 1998), such that small changes in probabilities are
associated with large changes in probability weights. Consider a probability weighting function, (p), monoton-
ically increasing and S-shaped. The elegant probability weighting explanation of the common ratio eect is that
the ratio of decision weights away from certainty is larger than the ratio of decision weights closer to certainty.
This allows for U(10) > (0:99)  U(50) and (0:99)  U(10) < (0:98)  U(50); v(10) < (0:98)=(0:99)  U(50)
as (0:98)=(0:99) > (0:99) when () is S-shaped. The probability weighting logic is the same in 1) vs 2)
and 2) vs 3) as (0:97)=(0:98) > (0:98)=(0:99) > (0:99) for an S-shaped, monotonic probability weighting
function.
6The numbers are unbalanced because subjects with ID numbers ending in 0, 1, 2, and 3 were asked to make
decision 1. Those with ID numbers ending in 4, 5 and 6 were asked to make decision 2 and those with ID
numbers ending in 7, 8, and 9 were asked to make decision 3.
7The test statistic z corresponds to the null hypothesis, H0, of equal proportions preferring P=P0 across
conditions.
8A potential counterpoint is that at probability 0:99, all of the `action' is eectively taken out of the proba-
bility weighting function. This interpretation is at odds with evidence on the shape of the probability weighting
3(1989) provides a complementary example, dramatically reducing common consequence eects
by moving slightly away from certainty.
The above demonstration helps to pin down the Allais intuition. Away from certainty in
decisions 2 and 3, individuals behave roughly consistently. However, when forced to com-
pare situations with certainty and uncertainty together in decision 1, individuals exhibit a
disproportionate preference for certain outcomes. Such intuition also carries through to ex-
perimental studies. Violations of expected utility are found to be substantially less prevalent
when all outcomes are uncertain (Camerer, 1992; Harless and Camerer, 1994; Starmer, 2000).
Additionally, a growing body of evidence, at odds with both expected utility and probability
weighting, suggests that utility at or near certainty may dier from utility away from certainty
(Gneezy, List and Wu, 2006; Simonsohn, 2009; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2009b). In this paper,
we demonstrate that allowing for discontinuous preferences at certainty can provide a tractable
representation of Allais' intuition and explain a variety of decision theory phenomena includ-
ing the certainty eect, experimentally observed probability weighting, the uncertainty eect,
extreme risk aversion over small stakes and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses continuity of preferences over certainty
and uncertainty and presents a simple discontinuous model of preferences. Section 3 summarizes
several prior studies suggestive of dierences between certain and uncertain utility. In Section
4, these results are applied to the ve decision theory phenomena mentioned above. Section 5
provides a brief discussion and conclusion.
2 Continuity over Certainty and Uncertainty
Most textbook treatments of expected utility include an axiom for preference continuity.9
With xed outcomes, preferences are represented as an ordering over probability distributions,
or lotteries. Let L represent the space of lotteries and let  be a complete, reexive and
function, but is similar in spirit to the violation in continuity we discuss below. In Section 4.1, we discuss
probability weighting results in more detail.
9The denition and treatment here is that of Varian (1992) and is provided primarily for reference.
4transitive preference ordering.
Denition (Continuity): Preferences are continuous if the sets fp 2 [0;1] :
p  x  (1   p)  y  zg and fp 2 [0;1] : p  x  (1   p)  y  zg are closed
for all x;y;z 2 L
Assume there exists a best lottery, b, and a worst lottery, w, such that for any lottery
z 2 L; b  z  w. For a given lottery z, there exists a probability mixture of w and b that is
in the better than set and another probability mixture of w and b that is in the worse than set.
This implies that there exists a third mixture, pz, such that pz  b  (1   pz)  w  z.
Importantly, continuity implies that for every certain outcome, a degenerate lottery, there
exists a probability mixture of the best and worst elements of L, a non-degenerate lottery,
that is indierent. This further implies that certain and uncertain utility must be functionally
identical. The proof is by contrapositive. That is, if certain and uncertain utility are not
functionally identical then one can construct a case which violates continuity.
Let there be a xed set of outcomes. Let v(x) represent utility under certainty and u(x)
represent utility under uncertainty and assume that both are increasing in x, but allow u(x)
to dier from v(x). Additionally, let there be standard expected utility away from certainty
such that for any gamble yielding xi with probability pi for i = 1;2;:::;S with pi < 1 8 i, total
utility is represented by
PS
i piu(xi).
For example, take the set of outcomes f0;10;50g and the set of lotteries (p1;p2;p3) such
that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 and pi  1; i = 1;2;3. Consider the degenerate lottery of 10 with
certainty, so (p1;p2;p3) = (0;1;0). The best lottery is 50 with certainty, (0;0;1), and the worst
lottery is 0 with certainty, (1;0;0). To satisfy continuity, one must nd a probability mixture
(a;1 a); 0  a  1 such that au(50)+(1 a)u(0) = 1v(10). Note that the mixture, because
it is a non-degenerate lottery, is necessarily evaluated using the uncertain utility function, u(),
and the certain outcome of 10 is evaluated with v(). The value au(50)+(1 a)u(0) < u(50) as
5long as a < 1 (a true mixture). If u(50) < v(10), continuity is violated. Figure 1 demonstrates
the logic.
Figure 1: Violating Continuity with u() 6= v()







a u(50) + (1−a) u(0)
Millions
Note: By allowing for a dierence between certain utility, v(), and uncertain utility, u(),
continuity is violated. No probability mixture, (a;1   a);a < 1, exists satisfying v(10) =
a  u(50) + (1   a)  u(0).
The example discussed above yields exactly the common ratio eect. A disproportionate
preference for security at certainty is represented by v(10) > u(50). An individual would choose
10 with certainty over 50 with probability 0.99 if v(10) > u(50). However, an individual would
choose 50 with probability 0:98 over 10 with probability 0:99 if 0:98u(50) > 0:99u(10). The
common consequence eect can be generated with a very similar argument.
A simple discontinuous utility function can parsimoniously represent the preferences dis-
6cussed above. Let there be a 1S vector of outcomes: X = (x1;x2;:::;xS). Let L be the set of
all lotteries over these outcomes. L can be partitioned into LD, the set of degenerate lotteries,
and LN the set of non-degenerate lotteries. Note that LD has exactly S elements, one for
each possible degenerate lottery over the S outcomes. Let xj represent the degenerate lottery
outcome associated with a given element of LD and let (pN1;pN2;:::;pNS) represent a given
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Note that if u() = v(), W() reduces to standard expected utility.10 Continuity is violated
if u(xi) 6= v(xi) for a given xi 2 X. If v(x) > u(x) for x > 0, then individuals exhibit a
disproportionate preference for certainty.
Critical eorts have been made to provide an axiomatic basis for such a discontinuous rep-
resentation of preferences (see Neilson, 1992; Schmidt, 1998; Diecidue, Schmidt and Wakker,
2004). These results demonstrate that with additional continuity or independence assumptions,
W(X;L) can represent standard expected utility preferences with a disproportionate preference
for certainty. However, the represented preferences will violate stochastic dominance (Schmidt,
1998; Diecidue et al., 2004). Though one could work around dominance with an `editing'
argument similar to that of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), this leaves the above model of
preferences with the somewhat undesirable property of violating dominance without such ad-
ditional elements. As such, in the words of Diecidue et al. (2004), `the interest of the model is
descriptive and lies in its psychological plausibility.'
It is important to note that allowing for discontinuous preferences over certainty and un-
certainty is not standard in the study of decision making under risk. However, in models of
time discounting such preferences frequently arise. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Strotz, 1956;
10One need not posit standard expected utility as the baseline when u() = v(). Prospect theory probability
weighting is also continuous in probabilities. We choose this baseline for two reasons: 1) to have a model with
a small deviation from standard expected utility and 2) to capture the stylized fact that away from certainty
individuals act mainly in line with expected utility.
7Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) is discontinuous at the
present. In such models, individuals discount between the present and one future period with a
low discount factor, , and between subsequent periods with a higher discount factor,  alone.
The model of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences is considered an elegant and powerful sim-
plication for several reasons. First, only a single parameter is added to standard exponential
discounting; second, many behavioral anomalies can be reconciled. Third, the null hypoth-
esis of dynamically consistent preferences can be tested. Our goal is similar. Consider, for
example, standard CRRA utility of v(x) = x. The discontinuity we envision is of the form
u(x) = x ;  >  > 0. A single parameter is added to a standard model, many behavioral
anomalies can be reconciled, and the null hypothesis of  = 0 can be tested. In the next section
we show several results in support of modeling such a discontinuity in risk preferences.
3 Experimental Results Suggesting Discontinuity
A growing body of literature is suggestive of discontinuous preferences over certainty and un-
certainty. Expected utility is generally found to perform well when all outcomes are uncertain
(Conlisk, 1989; Camerer, 1992; Harless and Camerer, 1994; Starmer, 2000).11 However, viola-
tions of expected utility abound when individuals are asked to consider certain and uncertain
outcomes together. Generally, the direction of these violations indicate a disproportionate pref-
erence for certainty. Of course, these ndings alone do not establish dierential treatment of
certain and uncertain utility. Importantly, there exists a collection of studies which test more
directly whether certain and uncertain utility should be treated as identical.
Among the most puzzling and surprising results is the `uncertainty eect' documented
by Gneezy et al. (2006) and reproduced by Simonsohn (2009). In Gneezy et al. (2006), 60
undergraduate subjects at the University of Chicago are randomly assigned to one of three
conditions in equal numbers. Subjects were asked to provide their willingness to pay (WTP)
11However, there do exist identied violations even when all things are uncertain. For examples and discussion,
see the noted citations and Wu and Gonzalez (1996).
8for a $100 gift certicate to a local bookstore, or for a $50 gift certicate to the bookstore, or
for a lottery with 50% chance of winning a $100 gift certicate and 50% chance of winning a
$50 gift certicate to the bookstore. WTP was elicited using the Becker, DeGroot, Marschak
mechanism (Becker, Degroot and Marschak, 1964), 5% of subjects had their choices actualized
and were given $100 to purchase the gift certicate or lottery. The average WTP for the $50
gift certicate in condition 2 was signicantly higher than the WTP for the lottery in condition
3.
The between-subject behavior of valuing a lottery lower than its worst possible outcome
violates expected utility and prospect theory probability weighting.12 The authors suggest
that the obtained `uncertainty eect' should be interpreted as a violation of the `internality
axiom' that `the value of a risky prospect must lie between the value of that prospect's highest
and lowest outcome' (Gneezy et al., 2006, p. 1284). This internality axiom, which has also
been called `betweenness' (Camerer and Ho, 1994) proceeds from continuity. If preferences
are continuous, then for a given degenerate lottery, say the $50 gift certicate, a probability
mixture from the strictly better than set and the weakly better than set must be at least as
good. As such, violations of the internality axiom could be viewed as violations of continuity.
The results of Gneezy et al. (2006) are indicative of certain outcomes being assessed dierently
than uncertain outcomes. Indeed (Gneezy et al., 2006) suggest subjects may `code' uncertain
lotteries dierently than certain outcomes and apply a direct premium for certainty akin to the
disproportionate preference v(x) > u(x) for x > 0.13
In Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b), we present a discounted expected utility violation that
is also suggestive of dierences between certain and uncertain utility. Using Andreoni and
Sprenger (2009a) Convex Time Budgets (CTB) and a within-subject design, 80 subjects are
asked to make intertemporal allocation decisions in two principal decision environments. In
12Both of these models respect `betweenness' (Camerer and Ho, 1994), such that lotteries must be valued at
some weighted average of the valuations of their outcomes.
13The authors express this premium as follows: `An individual posed with a lottery that involves equal chance
at a $50 and $100 gift certicate might code this lottery as a $75 gift certicate plus some risk. She might then
assign a value to a $75 gift certicate (say $35), and then reduce this amount (to say $15) to account for the
uncertainty' (Gneezy et al., 2006, p. 1291).






















































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The gure presents aggregate behavior for N = 80 subjects under two conditions:
(p1;p2) = (1;1), i.e. no risk, in blue; and (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5), i.e. 50% chance sooner pay-
ment would be sent and 50% chance later payment would be sent, in red. t = 7 days in all
cases, k 2 f28;56g days. Error bars represent 95% condence intervals, taken as +=   1:96
standard errors of the mean. Test of H0 : Equality across conditions: F14;2212 = 15:66; p < :001.
the rst decision environment, sooner and later payments are made 100% of the time.14 In the
second decision environment, sooner payments are made 50% of the time and later payments are
made 50% of the time (determined by rolls of two ten-sided die). The prediction from standard
discounted expected utility is that allocations should be identical across the two situations.
This is due to the common ratio of probabilities across the two condtions. Figure 2 reproduces
14See Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b) for eorts made to equate transaction costs.
10Figure 2 of Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b), presenting the sooner payment allocation decisions.
Allocations in the two decision environments dier dramatically, violating discounted expected
utility. Additionally, the pattern of results cannot be explained by either standard probability
weighting or temporally dependent probability weighting.15 In estimates of utility parameters,
utility function curvature is found to be markedly more pronounced when all payments are
risky as opposed to when all payments are certain, suggesting a disproportionate preference for
certainty, v(x) > u(x) for x > 0.16 For experimental payment values of around $20, certain
utility is estimated as v(x) = x; ^  = 0:988 (s:e: 0:002), uncertain utility is estimated as
u(x) = x ; ^  = 0:105 (0:017), and the null hypothesis of  = 0 is rejected.
These studies indicate that modeling utility as dierent for certain and uncertain outcomes
may help to explain decision theory phenomena that remain anomalous in expected utility and
probability weighting models. Additionally, many experimental methodologies use certainty
equivalence techniques, asking individuals to compare certain and uncertain outcomes. If cer-
tain and uncertain utility are dierent, this may help to explain some of the broad violations
of expected utility. In the following section, we discuss ve decision theory phenomena existent
in the literature that can be explained by allowing certain and uncertain utility to be dierent.
To demonstrate the eects we use the parameter estimates obtained in Andreoni and Sprenger
(2009b) in hopes of convincing readers that the dierence between certain and uncertain utility
need not be large to reconcile anomalous results.
4 Applications: Five Phenomena of Decision Theory
Allowing certain and uncertain utility to be dierent with a disproportionate preference for
certainty can account for ve important decision theory phenomena: the certainty eect, ex-
perimentally observed probability weighting, the uncertainty eect, experimentally observed
extreme risk aversion, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Readers will notice that although the
15See Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b) for discussion.
16Discounting is found to be virtually identical across the two conditions and very similar to Andreoni and
Sprenger (2009a).
11present section is titled `Five Phenomena', there are only four subsections. This is because one
of the ve decision theory phenemona we discuss is trivially generated by a dierence between
certain and uncertain utility.
The `certainty eect' is the robust nding, frequently derived from intuitions of the Allais
Paradox, that when certain options are available, they are disproportionately preferred. Al-
lowing certain and uncertain utility to dier with the assumption that v(x) > u(x) for x > 0
provides the certainty eect trivially. Certain options are assumed to be disproportionately
preferred via the functional dierence between u() and v(). In what follows, we discuss the
other four phenomena in detail.
4.1 Probability Weighting
In addition to the four-fold pattern of risk preferences over gains and losses relative to a ref-
erence point, one of prospect theory's major contributions to decision theory is the notion of
probability weighting (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995). Probability
weighting generally assumes that there exists a nonlinear function, (p), which maps objective
probabilities into subjective decision weights. () is normally assumed to be S-shaped. Figure
3 plots the popular one-parameter functional form (p) = p=(p(1   p))1= with  = 0:61
as estimated by (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).17 Low probabilities are upweighted and high
probabilities are downweighted. Identifying the general shape of the probability weighting
function and pinning down its parameter values has received substantial attention both theo-
retically and in experiments (see e.g., Tversky and Fox, 1995; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Prelec,
1998; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999).
Experiments demonstrating an S-shaped probability weighting function generally use cer-
tainty equivalence techniques (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995). That
is, individuals are asked to state a certain amount, C, that makes them indierent to a lottery
which yields X with probability p and 0 otherwise. Analysis proceeds as follows: certain and
17Other analyses with similar functional forms yield similar patterns and parameter estimates (for reviews,
see Prelec, 1998; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999).
12Figure 3: Standard Probability Weighting










































Note: The function (p) = p=(p(1   p))1= is plotted with  = 0:61 as found by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992).
uncertain utility are assumed identical, the utility of zero is normalized to zero, a functional
form for utility is posited, and (p) is identied as the value that rationalizes the indierence
condition
u(C) = (p)  u(X): (1)
In Tversky and Kahneman (1992), u(X) = X is posited along with the popular probability
weighting function noted above and the parameters of () and  are estimated jointly.18 In
Tversky and Fox (1995), the curvature parameter from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) of 0.88
18Additional utility parameters such as the degree of loss aversion are also estimated.
13is assumed and the parameters of a similar two-parameter () function are estimated.
If certain and uncertain utility are functionally dierent, and u(0) = 0, instead of (1) the
indierence condition is
v(C) = p  u(X): (2)
It is easy to see how this might lead to downweighting of high probability events. Dividing
(1) by (2) we obtain u(C)=v(C) = (p)=p. If v(C) > u(C), then (p)=p < 1. This, of course,
assumes that u(X) is parameterized the same way in both cases, which may not be true if one
were to estimate the data rst assuming (1) and then assuming (2).
Take a gamble with probability p = 0:90 of winning $50. Following the utility parameters
obtained in Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b), (2) would yield a certainty equivalent of C =
(0:9  500:99 0:11)1=0:99 = $29:10. Given a certainty equivalent of $29.10 and following (1)
with the utility parameters of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Tversky and Fox (1995),
one would infer a decision weight of (0:9) = 29:100:88=500:88 = 0:62, indicating a sharply
decreasing probability weighting function away from certainty.19 Now, take a gamble with
probability p = 0:01 of winning $50. Following (2), this would yield a certainty equivalent
of C = (0:01  500:99 0:11)1=0:99 = $0:31. Given a certainty equivalent of $0.31 and following
(1), one would infer a decision weight of (p) = 0:310:88=500:88 = 0:011, indicating a slight
upweighting at low probabilities.20
Experiments using certainty equivalence techniques to identify probability weighting would,
by our account, suer from an experimental aw: the certainty eect is built into the ex-
perimental design. Allowing for a dierence between certain and uncertain utility, a sharply
decreasing probability weighting function and upweighting of low probabilities can be gener-
ated. These are the hallmarks of the S-shaped probability weighting function. Interestingly,
19It is noteworthy that the curvature of 0.88 from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is identical to the uncertain
curvature parameter of ^    ^  = 0:88 from Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b).
20The inversion between upweighting and downweighting occurs because under the utility parameterization
if C < 1; v(C) < u(C) while for C > 1;v(C) > u(C). We recognize that these are likely to be pathological
cases, but note that upweighting of low probability events is distinctly less pronounced than downweighting of
high probability events (Prelec, 1998).
14when the certainty eect is eliminated by design, experimental data appear to reject probabil-
ity weighting. Andreoni and Harbaugh (2009) eliminate any certain outcomes, ask subjects to
trade probability for prize along a linear budget constraint, and nd surprising support in favor
of expected utility, while signicantly rejecting probability weighting.
4.2 The Uncertainty Eect
The uncertainty eect of valuing a lottery lower than its worst possible outcome is a surprising
and somewhat unintuitive result. The uncertainty eect violates expected utility, probability
weighting and any other utility representation respecting betweenness.
Consider the utility parameters obtained in Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b) and the original
uncertainty eect comparing a 50%-50% lottery paying $50 or $100 to the certainty of $50. The
utility of the lottery is given as UL = 0:5500:99 0:11 +0:51000:99 0:11 = 44:41. The utility of
the certain $50 is given as UC = 500:99 = 48:08, demonstrating the uncertainty eect of valuing
a lottery lower than its worst outcome.
Note should be made of two key issues. First, the uncertainty eect seems not to be
present for immediate monetary payments in certainty equivalents experiments (Birnbaum,
1992).21 Second, it is not observed within individuals (Gneezy et al., 2006). In addition to
our hypothesis, future research should examine whether the uncertainty eect is present within
individuals and across a variety of rewards, including money.
4.3 Extreme Risk Aversion
Experimentally elicited risk preferences generally yield extreme measures of risk aversion. These
results are at odds with standard expected utility theory as even moderate risk aversion over
small experimental stakes implies unbelievable risk aversion over large stakes (Rabin, 2000).
Importantly, risk preferences are frequently elicited using willingness to pay certainty equiva-
lence techniques similar to the experimental methods used to identify probability weighting.
21Though Gneezy et al. (2006) demonstrate that it is present for monetary payments over time.
15As such, certainty eects and extreme risk aversion may be conated.
Allowing for dierences between certain and uncertain utility, extreme experimental be-
havior can be generated. Consider the utility parameters obtained in Andreoni and Sprenger
(2009b) and the certainty equivalent of a 50%-50% lottery paying $50 or $0. Normalizing
u(0) = 0, the certainty equivalent is given as C = (0:5  500:99 0:11)1=0:99 = 16:07.
Under the standard assumption that u() = v(), one would nd the curvature parameter,
a, which rationalizes 16:07a = 0:5  50a. The solution is a = 0:61. Importantly, curvature
parameters obtained in low-stakes certainty equivalence studies and in auction experiments are
generally between 0.5 and 0.6.22 This suggests that part of experimentally obtained extreme risk
aversion may be associated with dierential assessment of certain and uncertain outcomes.23
4.4 Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting
In Section 2, we discussed the practice of modeling discontinuous, quasi-hyperbolic time prefer-
ences. Recently, arguments have been made that dynamically inconsistent preferences are gen-
erated by dierential risk on sooner and later payments (for psychological evidence, see Keren
and Roelofsma, 1995; Weber and Chapman, 2005). Halevy (2008) argues that dierential risk
leads to dynamic inconsistency because individuals have a temporally dependent probability
weighting function that is convex near certainty similar to standard probability weighting. The
probability of receiving payments is argued to decline through time, with present payments
being certain. If individuals weight probabilities in a non-linear fashion, then apparent present
bias is generated as a certainty eect.
We have demonstrated that if certain and uncertain utility are not identical, certainty
eects and sharply declining probability weights can be obtained. As such, one need not call on
22In the auction literature, mention is made of `square root utility' where   0:5. Holt and Laury (2002)
discuss several relevant willingness to pay results from the auction literature in line with this value. Interestingly,
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) present evidence on both willingness to pay and willingness to accept values
for lotteries. Though the curvature implied from willingness to pay certainty equivalents is around 0.6, the
curvature from willingness to accept treatments actually suggests risk-loving behavior.
23Note, our explanation is not sucient to produce the eect of extreme small stakes risk aversion when
comparing two uncertain outcomes as in Holt and Laury (2002). This, in turn, suggests that experimental
methodology may also be part of any discussion of extreme risk aversion.
16a complex probability weighting function to explain the phenomenon. If individuals exhibit a
disproportionate preference for certainty when it is available, then present, certain consumption
will be disproportionately favored over future, uncertain consumption. When only uncertain,
future consumption is considered, the disproportionate preference for certainty is not active,
generating apparent present-biased preference reversals. In Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b),
we show that apparent present bias (and future bias) can be generated experimentally via
comparisons of certainty and uncertainty.
Consider an individual asked to choose between $15 with certainty today and $20 with
uncertainty in one month. For simplicity, assume a monthly discount factor of  = 1 and
let p < 1 be the assessed probability of being paid in the future. Following the utility pa-
rameters of Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b), the relevant comparison is 150:99 = 14:59 versus
p  200:99 0:11 = p  13:96 < 13:96, and the individual opts for the certain, sooner payment. If
asked instead to choose between $15 with uncertainty in one month and $20 with equal uncer-
tainty in two months, the comparison is p150:99 0:11 = p10:83 versus p200:99 0:11 = p13:96,
the later payment is preferred, and a present-biased preference reversal is observed. This sug-
gests that discontinuous preferences over time and risk may have an identical source: the future
is inherently risky.
5 Conclusion
We provide a simple model of discontinuous utility over certainty and uncertainty. We demon-
strate that allowing for certain and uncertain utility can help to resolve ve decision theory
phenomena: the certainty eect, probability weighting, the uncertainty eect, extreme exper-
imental risk aversion, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. It is compelling that such a broad
set of phenomena can be reconciled with discontinuous preferences over certain and uncertain
outcomes. Our arguments lay the foundation for re-thinking certain and uncertain utility. It
is important to remember that allowing for discontinuous utility need not replace other inter-
pretations of the discussed phenomena, such as visceral present bias or non-linear probability
17weighting. However, accounting for a disproportionate preference for certainty, following the
intuition of Allais, only adds to our understanding of decision-making.
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